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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CALIFORNIA
Two recent decisions' by the California Supreme Court may
have a profound effect upon the handling of future criminal
cases during the investigatory and accusatory stages, and upon the
admissability of evidence gathered during those stages. Both cases
were decided on August 31, 1964, and each reversed a conviction
for murder. The reversible error, and the one with which this paper
is concerned, was that the defendant was denied his constitutional
right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'
FEDERAL CASES
The California court relied heavily upon two decisions by the
United States Supreme Court.' The first case, Gideon v. Wainwright,
involved a defendant charged with the commission of a non-capital
felony. He appeared in court without funds and asked the court to
appoint counsel for him. His request was denied on the ground that
Florida law permitted appointment for indigent defendants in capital
cases only. The defendant conducted his own defense and was con-
victed. After the Florida Supreme Court denied his application for
a writ of habeas corpus, he applied to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Supreme Court appointed counsel for him and
"requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and arguments,
'Should the Court's holding in Betts v. Brady be reconsidered.' "I
The Betts case held that a "refusal to appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant did not necessarily violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."5
Asserted denial (of due process) is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations fall short of such denial. 6
The opinion in Gideon' stated that since the Court in Betts8 treated
1 People v. Anderson, 61 A.C. 903, 394 P.2d 945, 40 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1964),
and People v. Dorado, 61 A.C. 892, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964). The
Attorney General has petitioned for and the court has granted a rehearing of People
v. Dorado. See infra notes 32-33.
2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964) and Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963).
5 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
6 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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Due Process as a "concept less rigid and more fluid than those en-
visaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights,"9 and since "the facts and circumstances are so nearly in-
distinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing
would require us to reject Mr. Gideon's claim that the Constitution
guarantees him the assistance of counsel."'" But the Court did not
agree with the prior interpretation of Due Process and concluded
that Betts should be overruled.
The Court next considered whether "right to counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment" is made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to Betts, which held that "ap-
pointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial,"' 2 the Court said:
Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of counsel for an
indigent criminal defendant was 'a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial,' it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth
Amendment requires in a federal court.1"
In support of its position, the Court cited Powell v. Alabama 4 where-
in the Court considered all the historical data examined in Betts
and unequivocally declared that "the right to the aid of counsel is
of this fundamental character."' " The fundamental nature of the
right was re-emphasized in later cases.'"
In reversing the state court's decision, the Court concluded by
saying:
[T]he Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break in its own well-
considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder
we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice.' 7
Escobedo v. Illinois,"s the second decision relied on by the
California Supreme Court, involved a convicted murderer who was
not permitted to consult his lawyer between the time he was taken
into custody and the completion of questioning by police. The posi-
9 Id. at 462.
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
11 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
12 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
Is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
14 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15 Id. at 68.
16 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
17 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).18 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
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tion taken by the state was that the right to counsel arises after
indictment. This was rejected by the court:
It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel,
under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of interroga-
tion, the authorities had secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had,
for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder.' 9
The Court then cited Gideon v. Wainwright2° to the effect that
every person accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled
to a lawyer at trial, and to grant the rule contended for by the state
would make the trial nothing more than an appeal from the inter-
rogation. In other words, granting a "right to counsel" at a formal
trial would guarantee nothing to the accused if the conviction was
already assured by the use of statements taken during pre-trial
examination when the accused was without counsel.
In Escobedo2' the court indicated that there is a time at which
an accused must either (1) be allowed counsel or (2) be advised
of his constitutional right to remain silent. That time is when the
investigation of a crime ceases to be a general inquiry and begins
to "focus" upon the particular suspect; when the suspect is taken
into custody and a process of interrogation is begun which lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements; or when the suspect has
requested and is denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer.
This is the language the California Supreme Court relied on in
reversing the convictions in People v. Anderson22 and People v.
Dorado.'
CALIFORNIA CASES
In People v. Anderson, defendant was arrested at about 7:00
p.m. and accused of murder. The police interrogated him that night
and the following morning. During the morning interrogation de-
fendant repeatedly requested counsel and said that without a
lawyer present he had nothing more to say. His requests were ig-
nored and he finally admitted that he had engaged in prior sexual
activity with the victim. This admission was relied on in support of
the charge of first degree murder.
The language of the California Supreme Court was almost the
same as that in Escobedo relative to "eliciting incriminating state-
19 Id. 84 S. Ct. at 1762.
20 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21 378 U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
22 61 A.C. 903, 394 P.2d 945, 40 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1964).
23 61 A.C. 892, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964).
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ments" and in differentiating between the investigatory and accusa-
tory stages of the case.24 The question of when the accused must
request counsel was answered as follows:
Although the defendant did not immediately request counsel but
initially said he could not remember what had happened, he did not
thereby forfeit his right to counsel. Before he gave the incriminating
statements defendant asked for counsel, and such request, at the
accusatory stage, under any reading of Escobedo, is more than ample.
Indeed we have held in People v. Dorado [citations omitted], at
this stage defendant need not even make the request. 25
The court considered these facts determinative: (1) the inves-
tigation had "focused" upon defendant; (2) he was taken into
police custody; (3) the police carried out a process of interrogation
that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, without granting
his request to consult an attorney, or without advising him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent. Because of this:
defendant was denied "the assistance of counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment "made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment" (Gideon v. Wainwright [citations omitted]) and no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation should have
been used against him at the trial.26
In People v. Dorado27 the defendant was convicted of malicious
assault with a deadly weapon resulting in a fellow prisoner's death.
Correctional officers undertook an immediate investigation and sus-
picion became "focused" on defendant. Defendant was interrogated
and admitted the killing.
A prison official who conducted the initial interrogation, and
who was present during the major part of defendant's interrogation
by members of the district attorney's office, testified that he did not
at any time inform defendant of his right to counsel, or of his right
to remain silent, nor did he hear anyone else so inform the defendant.
24 "These events leave little doubt that at the time of questioning the police
were engaged in a process of interrogation that lent itself to eliciting incriminating
statements from the accused; the police were not merely conducting a general inves-
tigation of the crime .... We find no merit in the suggestion that, because defendant
admitted that he must have committed the crime but did not describe the motivation,
the police were merely 'investigating' the motivation and hence had not reached
the accusatory stage. Such a contention confuses the meaning of the investigatory
and accusatory stages. The latter begins at the point when the police have ascer-
tained guilt; once the defendant admits he must have committed the crime the police
are necessarily engaged in accusatory questioning." People v. Anderson, 61 A.C.
903, 906-07, 394 P.2d 945, 947, 40 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1964).
25 People v. Anderson, 61 A.C. 903, 907, 394 P.2d 945, 947, 40 Cal. Rptr.
257, 259-60 (1964).
26 Id. at 904, 394 P.2d at 946, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (1964).
27 61 A.C. 892, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964).
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The court was then confronted with the problem of determining
whether the confession, assumirig it was voluntary, was properly
admitted into evidence in view of two United States Supreme Court
decisions.2" Those cases were decided against the backdrop of
Gideon v. Wainwright.' The court relied heavily on Gideon in
saying:
In essence the United States Supreme Court has chosen between
two opposing clusters of convictions delineated by Justice Frankfurter
in Culombe v. Connecticut [citations omitted]. On the one hand lies
the assertion that questioning of subjects is indispensible to police
work since many criminals cannot be convicted except by evidence
obtained through their admissions. . . . On the other hand lies the
assumption stated by Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indiana [citations
omitted], that "Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial
system .... Under our system society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must
establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under
judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation. ' 80
The court then interpreted Escobedo as concluding that once sus-
picion has "focused" on the accused, and the purpose of interro-
gating him is to obtain incriminating statements, he has a consti-
tutional right to counsel. It also indicated that the considerations
of our accusatorial, as opposed to the inquisitorial system, outweigh
those which assert that questioning of suspects is indispensable to
police work.
Since Dorado did not request counsel, the court had to decide
whether this distinguished the case from Escobedo. It concluded
that it did not.
... the constitutional right to counsel precludes the use of incrimina-
ting statements elicited by police during an accusatory investigation
unless that right is intelligently waived; no waiver can be presumed
if the investigating officers do not inform the suspect of his right to
counsel or his right to remain silent.
We reach this conclusion because (1) the Supreme Court ruled
in Massiah that assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
attaches to pre-indictment interrogations since that period is crucial
to a proper defence; (2) the Supreme Court held in Escobedo that,
once investigation has focused on the accused, assistance to counsel
is equally as important before indictment as after indictment. 3'
The court found "no strength in the artificial requirement that the
28 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80 People v. Dorado, 61 A.C. 892, 897-98, 394 P.2d 952, 955, 40 Cal. Rptr.
264, 267 (1964).
81 Id. at 899, 394 P.2d at 956, 40 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1964).
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defendant must specifically request counsel; the test must be a sub-
stantive one: whether or not the point of necessary protection for
guidance of counsel has been reached." The court added that, "The
defendant who does not realize his rights . . .and . ..does not
request counsel is the very defendant who most needs counsel." 2
The Dorado case has evoked expressions of considerable con-
cern, especially among law enforcement officers. 83 On the other
hand, as might be expected, the decisions have received wide
acclaim from defense attorneys.3 4
CONCLUSION
The current state of the law in California can be summarized
as follows: Once investigation has focused upon a suspect, his right
to counsel arises. The right arises whether or not he requests con-
sultation with his attorney. If he does not request counsel, he must
be advised of his right to remain silent. Unless he intelligently waives
right to counsel or to remain silent, he has been denied a right
guaranteed him by the Constitution.
Thurman L. Gray
32 Ibid.
33 A petition for rehearing has been granted in Dorado and the Attorney
General has been joined by 55 District Attorneys in an Amici Curiae brief advancing
the following arguments: that the decision was not compelled by Escobedo v.
Illinois; that the two cases are distinguishable on fact; that while Dorado was a
prime suspect, he was not the "accused in the sense that term was used by the
Supreme Court. The decision is further challenged on the basis that there is no
constitutional right to counsel during a police investigation and that the privilege
against self-incrimination is never invoked by remaining silent. The Petition also
contends that the decision will make the enforcement of law an impossibility in many
instances; the decision is impossible to administer and apply; the "harmless error"
rule should apply in cases in which a confession or admission obtained in violation of
the right to counsel has been received; and the rule of the Dorado case should
be prospective in operation.
84 Amid curiae briefs have also been filed by numerous attorneys on behalf and
in support of the position of defendant and appellant. The positions taken by the
briefs generally are that the court has correctly interpreted and applied Escobedo
v. Illinois; that the rule of law stated by the court is not impractical and will not
unduly hamper law enforcement officers; that the respondent is in gross error in
stating there is no right to silence; that the respondent is acting as a "Prophet of
Doom;" that the interrogation of a suspect upon whom the accusatory process has
been focused is part of a criminal prosecution within the Sixth Amendment; that
the courts uniformly apply retroactively decisions upholding constitutional rights;
and that the "Doctrine of Escobedo may not constitutionally be limited to prospec-
tive application only." Brief for Robert H. Lund, E. Fred Lightner, William T.
Pillsbury, and David D. Battin of Long Beach, California, and Jim F. Kingham, Esq.
of London, England, as Amici Curiae People v. Dorado, 61 A.C. 892, 394 P.2d
952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964), and Brief for National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco
Chapter Amicus Curiae People v. Dorado, 61 A.C. 892, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr.
264 (1964).
